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CLC number: TP309

On-line Access: 2018-06-07

Received: 2016-12-21

Revision Accepted: 2017-04-10

Crosschecked: 2018-04-08

Cited: 0

Clicked: 1528

Citations:  Bibtex RefMan EndNote GB/T7714

 ORCID:

Yan-wei Zhou

http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7254-3579

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Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering  2018 Vol.19 No.4 P.481-493

http://doi.org/10.1631/FITEE.1601849


A leakage-resilient certificateless public key encryption scheme with CCA2 security


Author(s):  Yan-wei Zhou, Bo Yang, Hao Cheng, Qing-long Wang

Affiliation(s):  School of Computer Science, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an 710119, China; more

Corresponding email(s):   zyw@snnu.edu.cn, byang@snnu.edu.cn, nicke_cheng@yahoo.com.cn, qlwang@chd.edu.cn

Key Words:  Certificateless public-key encryption, Leakage-resilience, Provable security, CCA2 security, Decisional Diffie-Hellman


Yan-wei Zhou, Bo Yang, Hao Cheng, Qing-long Wang. A leakage-resilient certificateless public key encryption scheme with CCA2 security[J]. Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering, 2018, 19(4): 481-493.

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Abstract: 
In recent years, much attention has been focused on designing provably secure cryptographic primitives in the presence of key leakage. Many constructions of leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives have been proposed. However, for any polynomial time adversary, most existing leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives cannot ensure that their outputs are random, and any polynomial time adversary can obtain a certain amount of leakage on the secret key from the corresponding output of a cryptographic primitive. In this study, to achieve better performance, a new construction of a chosen ciphertext attack 2 (CCA2) secure, leakage-resilient, and certificateless public-key encryption scheme is proposed, whose security is proved based on the hardness of the classic decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. According to our analysis, our method can tolerate leakage attacks on the private key. This method also achieves better performance because polynomial time adversaries cannot achieve leakage on the private key from the corresponding ciphertext, and a key leakage ratio of 1/2 can be achieved. Because of these good features, our method may be significant in practical applications.

抗泄露的CCA2安全的无证书公钥加密机制

摘要:近年来,存在密钥泄露环境下密码学机制的安全性成为该领域研究热点,一些能够抵抗泄露攻击的密码学原语相继被提出。由于现有相关构造中,抗泄露密码学原语无法保证其输出对于任意多项式时间敌手完全随机,因此敌手能够从相应抗泄露密码学原语的输出中获知密钥部分信息。为获得更佳性能,提出一个抗泄露的CCA2安全的无证书公钥加密机制,基于经典的判定性Diffie-Hellman假设证明了该方案的安全性。分析显示,对于任意敌手,该方案输出均完全随机,使得敌手无法从给出的密文中获知密钥相关信息;此外,该方案具有较高泄露率。由于这些良好特性,该方案在实际应用中具有广泛应用前景。

关键词:无证书公钥加密;泄露容忍;可证安全性;CCA2安全性;判定性Diffie-Hellman假设

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