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Abstract: This paper establishes a new framework for modeling electrical cyber-physical systems (ECPSs), integrating both power grids and communication networks. To model the communication network associated with a power transmission grid, we use a mesh network that considers the features of power transmission grids such as high-voltage levels, long-transmission distances, and equal importance of each node. Moreover, bidirectional links including data uploading channels and command downloading channels are assumed to connect every node in the communication network and a corresponding physical node in the transmission grid. Based on this model, the fragility of an ECPS is analyzed under various cyber attacks including denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, replay attacks, and false data injection attacks. Control strategies such as load shedding and relay protection are also verified using this model against these attacks.

This paper describes a new model for the electrical cyber-physical systems (ECPSs) for the power grid. The authors extend control protocols to the proposed model and study several attack scenarios through numerical simulation. The new model incorporates power grid with communication network by taking advantages of their special characteristics. Specifically, the high voltage level, long transmission distance, and a meshed topology for the communication network.

考虑信息安全的电力信息物理系统建模研究

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