CLC number: TP301
On-line Access: 2024-08-27
Received: 2023-10-17
Revision Accepted: 2024-05-08
Crosschecked: 2019-09-04
Cited: 0
Clicked: 6328
Lei Yu, Xiao-fang Zhao, Yan Jin, Heng-yi Cai, Bo Wei, Bin Hu. Low powered blockchain consensus protocols based on consistent hash[J]. Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering, 2019, 20(10): 1361-1377.
@article{title="Low powered blockchain consensus protocols based on consistent hash",
author="Lei Yu, Xiao-fang Zhao, Yan Jin, Heng-yi Cai, Bo Wei, Bin Hu",
journal="Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering",
volume="20",
number="10",
pages="1361-1377",
year="2019",
publisher="Zhejiang University Press & Springer",
doi="10.1631/FITEE.1800119"
}
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%I Zhejiang University Press & Springer
%DOI 10.1631/FITEE.1800119
TY - JOUR
T1 - Low powered blockchain consensus protocols based on consistent hash
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A1 - Bo Wei
A1 - Bin Hu
J0 - Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering
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PB - Zhejiang University Press & Springer
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DOI - 10.1631/FITEE.1800119
Abstract: Current blockchain consensus protocols have a triangle of contradictions in aspects of decentralization, security, and energy con-sumption, and cannot be synchronously optimized. We describe a design of two new blockchain consensus protocols, called “CHB-consensus” and “CHBD-consensus,” based on a consistent hash algorithm. Honest miners can fairly gain the opportunity to create blocks. They do not consume any extra computational power resources when creating new blocks, and such blocks can obtain the whole blockchain network to confirm consensus with fairness. However, malicious miners have to pay massive computational power resources for attacking the new block creation privilege or double-spending. blockchain networks formed by CHB-consensus and CHBD-consensus are based on the same security assumption as that in Bitcoin systems, so they save a huge amount of power without sacrificing decentralization or security. We analyze possible attacks and give a rigorous but adjustable validation strategy. CHB-consensus and CHBD-consensus introduce a certification authority (CA) system, which does not have special management or control rights over blockchain networks or data structures, but carries the risk of privacy breaches depending on credibility and reliability of the CA system. Here, we analyze the robustness and energy consumption of CHB-consensus and CHBD-consensus, and demonstrate their advantages through theoretical derivation.
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